

“Sweden’s neutral policy with respect to its UN co-operations
in 1950s and in the early 1960s”

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the transformation of the nature of Swedish foreign policy—its neutral policy—with respect to its participation in the UN operations in 1950s and the early 1960s. The main question is whether the Swedish government had placed consistently priority on its neutral policy over its UN co-operations. By referring to secondary sources, I analyzed the Swedish government attitude toward the four cases of the UN operations: The Korean War, The Suez War, The Lebanon Crisis, and The Congo War. The overall conclusion is that Sweden had put emphasis on its neutral policy over its UN co-operations except in the case of Congo. While in the previous three cases, the Swedish government decided to participate in the UN operations by finding the safe potential to keep itself out of a conflict between the great powers, in the case of Congo, Sweden’s foreign policy was not necessarily driven by a pragmatic response to the international environment but by the personal relationship with Hammarskjöld and the idealistic desire to contribute to international peace and order.

Key words: Sweden, Neutral policy, UN operation, Peace-keeping operation, UN observing operation, Korean War, Suez War, Lebanon, Crisis, Congo Crisis.

Preface

This paper examines how Sweden's policy of neutrality was transformed between 1950s and 1960s by participating in peace-keeping and mediation operation in the United Nations (UN). The analysis will be focus on how Sweden reconciles the conflicting goals of maintaining neutrality and participating in the United Nations peace-keeping and observing operations. The main question is whether Sweden had always put priority on its neutral policy over its UN co-operation over 1950s and 1960s or not. Was it true that Sweden did participate actively in the UN operations only when the Swedish government found it possible to keep the policy of non-alignment? So far, studies of neutrality have been concentrated either on its nature from a legal perspective or on the evaluation of how well Sweden achieved its neutrality during war-time, specifically under the pressure of Nazi Germany. It is still worth studying Sweden's neutrality with respect to its participation in the UN in the early post war period.

In order to analyze the transformation of the nature of Sweden's policy of, the following four cases are examined: The Korean War, The Suez War, The Lebanon Crisis, and The Congo Crisis. Due difficulty in examining and reviewing primary sources in Swedish, I primarily examined sources and synthesized them together in order to suit my analysis.

This paper is divided into three components. Firstly, a brief explanation of Sweden's policy of neutrality is given by referring to its history. Secondly, an analysis of four case studies. Lastly, by comparing the cases mentioned above, I arrive at a conclusion of Swedish foreign policy.

1 : The nature of Sweden's policy of neutrality

(1) Brief summary of Swedish policy of neutrality

Sweden has not been involved in wars since 1814 due to its policy of neutrality. This tradition of neutrality began after the Napoleon war ended in 1814, when Sweden struggled to find a safe position among other great powers, (i.e Britain and Russia). Later in 1834 Sweden's policy of neutrality began, when the Swedish government sent a letter hinting of its intention not to have coalition with neither Britain nor Russia¹. By pursuing its neutral position outside great military countries, Sweden was able to avoid the Crimean War, the German-Danish War, and both World Wars in the early twentieth century. After World War II ended, Sweden maintained its policy of neutrality by combining its active participation in

¹ Wilhelm M. Carlgren, "*Neutrality and defense: the Swedish experience*" (Wallin&Dalholm Boktr AB 1984)

the United Nations.

(2)Neutrality from legal point of view

Sweden's policy of neutrality was not based exactly on law, unlike Switzerland's, which was more permanent and inflexible with a basis in its constitution². According to Ross, "neutrality is rooted neither in the Swedish constitution of 1809, which was drafted long before neutrality developed, even intermittently, into a doctrine of state, nor in any convention of international law". However, Ross added that "these conceptual differences between the two states are rather less decisive than they first appear" and that both states' policies stem ultimately from their own free choice, and are only restricted by their individual perceptions of what constitutes allowable neutral activity³". Despite the difference of neutrality among two countries, whether they would be able to maintain their neutrality depended on how credible other countries regarded them.

From a legal perspective, many researchers today argued that it was "4a violation of neutrality that Sweden permitted transit over Sweden of unarmed German troops and war materials under Swedish control" from 1940 to 1943. However, from realist perspectives, it can be argued that Sweden succeeded in keeping itself out of the war by flexibly interpreting its policy of neutrality.

(3)Interpretation from constructivist perspective

There are debates concerning whether the Swedish policy of neutrality was the product of its realistic calculation of the international environment or was motivated by active idealism influenced by domestic factors. According to Sverker Astrom, one of the key shapers of Sweden's post Sweden's foreign policy, Sweden's neutrality was advanced as an attempt to protect its territory and to secure its interests from great powers and 'it was simply a response to the international environment, based on pragmatic strategic considerations. However, according to Christine Agius, this explanation from Realist perspective is unsatisfying. From constructivist perspective, she points out the influences of domestic factors, including impact of history, political processes and vital underlying social and cultural influences⁵. In addition, she points out the fact that the Sweden's active involvement as a mediator and as peace keeper in 1960s was inspired by its domestic political development, especially the dominant social democratic party's identity, such as universalism, equality and solidarity.

² Sverker Astrom, "Sweden's policy of neutrality", (The Swedish Institute 1883) 6

³ John F. L. Ross "Neutrality and International Sanctions — Sweden. Switzerland and Collective Security"(Praeger Publisher, 1989) 43

⁴ Bruce Hopper "Sweden: A case study in neutrality"(Foreign Affairs 23, 1944-1945) 442

⁵ Christine Agius, "The social construction of Swedish neutrality" (Manchester University Press 2006) 101

(4)Neutrality in respect to the United Nations

After World War II ended, tension between the U.S and Soviet Union increased. Sweden decided to keep its policy of neutrality—non-alignment in a peace period—intending to keep itself into war between the great power blocs. Conversely, Sweden decided to join the United Nations in 1946, finding that maintaining non-alignment and participating in the UN was not contradictory. There was a consensus on the whole among parties to join the UN⁶. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, given the fact that the Soviet Union had increased its influences over neighboring countries such as the Baltic States and Finland, the geographical buffer zones, which used to exist were weakened following the war. Therefore, Sweden lost its geographical advantage in a defense against Russia. Another reason was that the UN would not be able to give a legally binding recommendation to its membership countries when one of five countries consisting of the Security Council exercised its veto power. In short, it was most likely that even after Sweden joined the United Nations, Sweden could maintain its neutral position outside two blocks in case that Security Council could not reach an agreement.

(5)the Scandinavian military alliance and the NATO

As the gulf between East and West blocs widened, issues regarding whether Sweden should join a Western collective security organization, such as the Atlantic Pact which later would be called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Alternatively, the option to create a neutral military alliance in Scandinavia with Norway and Denmark was discussed. There was concern over whether Sweden was able to defend itself with its military capacity alone if other stronger countries such as Russia might attack Sweden. Norway insisted that the Scandinavian military alliance consisting of these three countries was not strong enough to defend the region from others and that it needed to be supported by the Western-bloc in respect to purchasing armament materials⁷. After Denmark and Norway chose to take part in NATO instead of creating a Scandinavian neutral alliance with Sweden, Sweden ultimately decided to maintain its neutral policy.

The failure of these three countries to reach a Scadinavian Alliance had something to do with their respective war experiences. Norway had suffered the pains and stresses of German occupation, after having met the threat of invasion even after a policy of neutrality, and was determined not to be plunged into that

⁶ Elis Hastad, "Sweden's Attitude Toward the United Nations" *"Sweden and the United Nation"* (Carnegie Endowment International Peace 1956) 73

⁷ Elis Hastad, *"Sweden's Attitude Toward the United Nations"* 62

trap again⁸. Another reason for Sweden refusing to join NATO was related to the Finland factor. As Tingsten Herbert argued, “a powerful reason for Swedish neutrality has been a fear that Russia might occupy Finland or stiffen its policy towards that country if Sweden were to enter NATO⁹”. It can be concluded that the Finland factor as well as its own successful experiences with neutral policy contributed to the Swedish government decision to keep its policy of neutrality.

2, Four cases—Korean War, Suez war, Lebanon crisis, and Congo crisis.

(1) Korean wars

After Sweden joined the United Nations, there was no concrete plan for how Sweden would arrange its military assistance to the United Nations when Sweden was to be required to provide it. Then on June 25th 1950, the Korean Wars broke out, 1950 when North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea (South Korea). On June 27th, the Security Council adopted Resolution 83, proposed by the United States, denouncing the invasion by North Korea and requesting “all member states to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities¹⁰. Sweden voted in favor of this resolution. In order to take a concrete action, however, the Swedish government had to consult the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. The Swedish government gave the following announcements on June 3rd: “Sweden shared the Security Council’s opinion that North Korea, through its action, was guilty of a breach of the peace” but “on the other hand, the government was not in a position to place armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations”¹¹. On July 20th, the Swedish government offered to the South Korea humanitarian aid in the form of field hospital units¹². The Foreign Minister of Sweden, Osten Unden gave a speech on August 30th that although Sweden gave assistance to the South Korea under solidarity to the UN, it is the Swedish government that has the final say over whether to comply with the request from the UN and “If by some terrible misfortune the Korean war should develop into a war between the great powers, then Sweden’s policy must be to try to keep out of the war with the aid of her defenses—the policy, that is to say, of armed neutrality¹³”.

⁸ Harald Wigforss “*Sweden And The Atlantic Pact*”(International Organization, 1949, vol. 3, issue 03) 435

⁹ Tingsten Herbert. “*Issues in Swedish Foreign Policy*” (Foreign Affairs, an American Quarterly Review, 37:1/4, 1958/1959) 474

¹⁰ UN document, S/1505

¹¹ Elis Hastad, “*Sweden’s Attitude Toward the United Nations*”P69

¹² Year book of the United Nations, 1950, P 225

¹³ Elis Hastad, “*Sweden’s Attitude Toward the United Nations*”P73

Korean War – The resolution toward the Chinese intervention

The United Nations forces (Allied Forces), which were organized under the command of the U.S, pushed back the North Korean forces. However, on October 25, 1950, as the Allied Forces crossed over the 38 Parallel, Chinese soldiers began to take part in the war. Although the Chinese government claimed that these Chinese soldiers were voluntarily organized, it was revealed later that the Communist Party took the initiative to organize and support the soldiers. The Chinese government insisted that the Chinese soldiers' participation would be justified, considering the attempt of the U.S, which was disguised as the allied forces, to attack the territory of China.

The Western bloc in the UN attempted to take actions against China through sanctions. The U.S proposed a draft in the General Assembly requesting member states "to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea" and "to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea¹⁴". In the end, the Swedish government decided to abstain from voting. Referring to the situation where other western countries, such as Denmark and Norway, voted in favor of these resolutions, there were criticisms of the attitude of the Swedish government toward the voting for abstention. In addition, *Dagens Nyheter*, one of the Sweden's leading newspapers, denounced the attitude of the Swedish government as double standard. For the Swedish government voted for censuring the North Korea as an aggressor when it attacked South Korea, but did not do so against China, whose soldiers attacked Allied Forces. However, taking into account of the fact that Sweden supported the United Nations' action against North Korea on the assumption that the conflict would be restricted to Korea, the Swedish government decision for voting for abstention of the sanction did not seem to be strange. On the contrary, it seemed that behind the Swedish government's decision, there was a consistent political will to pursue the possibility to keep itself out of a conflict between the great powers.

(2)The Suez War

On July 1956, General Nasser of Egypt declared a nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was a reaction to the decision by U.S Secretary of State, John Foster Dulle, to freeze financial aid from the U.S for the Aswan High Dam. The announcement of the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt surprised the world, especially Israel, Britain, and France. The latter two countries raised an objection against the decision due to their interests in the Suez Canal while Israel was troubled due to security reasons. While the three countries attempted to

¹⁴ UN document, General Assembly/1771, February 1st, 1951.

arrive at a peaceful solution through negotiations, they simultaneously were prepared to take a military action against Egypt. After the failure of the London Conference to put the Suez Canal under joint control, this dispute was brought up to the Security Council. Dag Hammarskjold, a Swedish diplomat who was the United Nations Secretary General at that time, continued to pursue a solution to the problem through negotiations with the foreign minister of Britain, France and Egypt. On October 29, 1956, Israel troops crossed the border of Egypt and invaded the Sinai Peninsula, occupying the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. The next day, Britain and France announced that they would intervene in the Suez Canal for protection if Israel were not to accept an immediate cease fire. In reality, these two countries had a secret agreement with Israel and begun intervening in the Suez Canal. The U.S proposed a resolution to the Security Council. Firstly, the withdrawal of Israel troops and secondly the non-intervention by other countries. The resolution was rejected by France and Britain.

Yugoslavia proposed to discuss this issue at the General Assembly. On the first of November, the General Assembly accepted a draft resolution made by the U.S and decided to ask Hammarskjold to take initiatives to pursue the cease-fire. As Lester Pearson, a Canadian diplomat, proposed to establish the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF), Hammarskjold, though in doubt, was convinced that it was the only choice to solve the deadlock. He assumed it necessary to eliminate the troops of Israel, Britain and France before the Soviet Unions and others could intervene in the area. Hammarskjold and Pearson finally elaborated the draft of the United Nations Emergency Forces, which requested that these forces be composed of small countries, with no great powers such as Britain and France, and that these forces be dispatched under the consent of the Egyptian government. The offer of support for the UNEF came from many countries: Norway, Canada, Colombia and India and so on¹⁵. The UNEF was dispatched on November 18th after Hammarskjold visited Nasser in Cairo and persuaded him to accept it. The withdrawal of the troops of Britain and France was completed on December 22nd.

The request from Hammarskjold to Sweden for its military contribution to the UNEF arrived on November 5th. The Swedish government held a special cabinet meeting and announced an official statement saying: "the Swedish government is in principle ready to assist in organizing a Swedish military contingent intended as part of the suggested international forces¹⁶". Although the Agrarian party

¹⁵ Those are the countries which join the UNEF: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia

¹⁶ Governmental Bill 198/ 1956, from Nile Skold "United Nation Peace Keeping after Suez War" (Hurst & Company, London ST, Martin' s Press New York 1996) 31

showed some doubts about this view, most of politicians reached a consensus for the participation of Swedish troops in the UNEF¹⁷. There were two options that Sweden could make to dispatch its troops: Firstly, revising a law which stated that the military troops be used only for its self defense. Secondly, recruiting soldiers on voluntary basis instead of revising the law. Sweden finally reached the agreement to adopt the voluntary recruiting system for the UNEF¹⁸. In the end, Sweden dispatched over 400 soldiers as parts of the UNEF.

How did Sweden interpret its neutral policy and its contribution to the United Nations? It could be argued that there was no contradiction for Sweden to maintain its neutrality and contribution to the UN. Firstly, the possibility of the war between the great powers was considered to be low since both the U.S and Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of the UNEF. Secondly, the military interventions of Britain, France and Israel were clearly challenges to the order of the United Nations. Thirdly, leaving these military troops in the area would trigger the intervention of Soviet Union and China, which might develop into the war between great powers. In this sense, it was logical that Sweden contributed to the UNEF for the purpose of the neutral policy and contribution to the United Nations.

(3)Lebanon Crisis

On February, 1958, Egypt and Syria entered into an alliance called the “United Arab Republic”, which changed the balance of power in the Middle East. The president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who advocated Pan-Arabism, hardened its policy toward the western bloc and supported anti-government movements within other Arab countries which had strong ties with the West. There was a growing sense of civil disturbances among the countries such as Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, all of whose governments positioned themselves as anti-Nasser. Iraq and Jordan entered into an alliance known as the “Arab Federation” in order to counter the balance of power against the United Arab Republic, whereas Lebanon, taking into account of the majority of Christians in the country, decided to pursue its own way instead of joining the Arab Federation.

However, in Lebanon, there were growing criticisms toward the president, Camille Chamoun, for his pro-western policy and his intention to seek an amendment to the Constitution which would enable him to be re-elected for a

¹⁷ Nile Skold, “*United Nation Peace Keeping after Suez War*” (Hurst&Company, London ST, Martin’s Press New York 1996) 31

¹⁸ Nile Skold, 1996, 31

second term¹⁹. Through May of 1958, the Lebanese government contended that the reason for the deterioration of the Lebanese situation was that the United Arab Republic was training the rebellious elements and providing anti-government groups in Lebanon arms and supplies.

The Lebanese government decided to ask for help from the United Nations. On May 27th, this issue was brought up into the Security Council. The U.S stated that it was preparing to send its military to Lebanon for assistance. The Soviet Union showed the anger against the announcement. The small dispute in Middle East suddenly turned the Lebanon into a dangerous place which would draw the great powers into a war. Dag Hammarskjold thought that every possible measure had to be taken to prevent a future-disaster. On June 10th, the Swedish delegate, Mr. Jarring, took the floor at the Council meeting, presenting a draft resolution that might become a solution to this case. The resolution requested that the United Nations dispatch observer groups to “ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders²⁰”. As soon as the draft was accepted by the voting next day, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established. The members for this mission were recruited from 21 countries in the end, such as Sweden, Norway and India²¹. The mission of UNOGIL was later considered to be the first prevention measure taken by the UN in its history.

However, the peaceful situation in Lebanon did not last long. The Iraq revolution occurred on July 14th, in which the King Faisal II was killed together with other governmental officials. The U.S concluded that the coup d’etat in Iraq was carried out by members of the Communist party of Iraq. Fearing that the incident would have bad consequence on the situation in Lebanon, the Lebanese government asked the U.S to send its military force and the U.S began to send its military troops in Lebanon. The British government also dispatched its military troops in a coast of Jordan. Hammarskjold showed his anger to these actions by the U.S and Britain for the reason that this action would deteriorate the attitude of Egypt toward the Western countries. Although the U.S government proposed that its military troops and the UNOGIL should collaborate together in Lebanon, Hammarskjold refused the offer, for the UN’s position of impartiality would be risked if the UNOGIL was mixed up with the U.S troops. Hammarskjold was

¹⁹ Gerald L. Curtis “*The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon*” (International Organization Foundation, Vol.18. No.4 (Autumn. 1964) 739

²⁰ UN Document S/4023

²¹ Those are the countries which join the UNOGIL: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal and Thailand

determined that if not for the UNOGIL, it would not only make Lebanon the place where great powers face each other but also make it difficult for the U.S troops to withdraw from Lebanon. The UNOGIL was indispensable as a buffer to prevent a conflict between great powers.

Unexpectedly, Hammarskjöld received an announcement from his home country. On July 16th, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Osten Unden, instructed his representative at the UN, Gunnar Jarring, to present to the Council a resolution stating that “the action now taken by the United States Government has substantially altered the conditions under which the Security Council decided on 11 June 1958 to send observers to Lebanon”, and requesting the Secretary-General to suspend the activities of the observers in Lebanon until further notice²²”.

He stated that “it was a great pity that neither the United States in landing troops in Lebanon nor Britain moving into Jordan was aware of the fact that such actions could peril peace, regardless of how noble and moral their motives were²³”. Unden was concerned about bad consequences that the arrival of the U.S troops in Lebanon might have on the UNOGIL where Sweden was participated and was worried that there was the possibility that Sweden might be involved in a conflict if the Soviet Union or other Eastern countries dispatch their troops in Lebanon. Hammarskjöld attempted to dissuade Unden from presenting the proposal but he refused the request. The proposal made by Sweden, requesting the suspension of the UNOGIL at the Security Council, was rejected with only Sweden and Soviet Union in favor. Hammarskjöld later described the action taken by the Swedish government by stating that “Sweden was the only country that had betrayed me²⁴”.

Hammarskjöld was aware of the fact that the easiest way to get the U.S troops out of Lebanon was to expand the role of UNOGIL. On July 21st, Japan took the initiative to propose a draft that would strengthen the role of UNOGIL and give increased initiative to the Secretary General²⁵. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal but did not oppose the Secretary General taking initiative for solving the problem. Hammarskjöld attempted to increase the size of the role of the UNOGIL. On August 18th, the Swedish government, which for a period of time considered withdrawing its eight observers, decided to send seven more observers to make it

²² UN document S/4054,

²³ New York Times, “*Swedish Minister Scores US policy*” 1958, October 5,

²⁴ “*The adventure of Peace: Dag Hammarskjöld and the Future of the UN*” (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 82

²⁵ UN Yearbook 1958, P 42

possible to start the evacuation of the US troops²⁶. After reaching the agreement with the Lebanese government on October 8th, the U.S troops gradually started to withdraw from Lebanon.

(4) Congo Crisis

On July 6th, Congolese troops rebelled against Belgium generals soon after the Republic of Congo became independent from Belgium. The Belgian government decided to send its military troops in order to protect its citizens in the Congo. Backed up by the Belgian government, the President of Katanga Province, Moise Tshombe, declared its secession from the Congo. However, Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba, respectively the President and the Prime-Minister of the Congo, could not accept the declaration and sent a request to the Secretary General for the UN military assistance in order to remove the Belgian troops from the Congo.

On July 13th, Hammarskjold held a Security Council meeting under Article 99. Since Belgium was involved in this conflict, there was a possibility for Eastern countries to intervene in the area, under the cause of protection of the Congo from the western imperialism. Hammarskjold proposed to send the UN troops so that they could maintain the peace while promoting the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. The Security Council passed this proposal with the abstention of France, Britain and China. Within 48 hours after the voting, the first UN troops, which would later be called as ONUC (Organization des Nations Unies au Congo), arrived at Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo.

However, the situation did not turn out to be promising. Although many of the Belgian troops withdrew from Congo, Belgian contingents remained stationed in Katanga. Lumumba claimed that the UN troops intervene in Katanga as soon as possible in order to force the Belgian troops to withdraw, while Hammarskjold was opposed to using the ONUC for combat operations, which he thought would exceed the UN role and make it difficult for the UN to promote the peace in the Congo. Hammarskjold also assumed that it was vital to reach a consensus with Tshombe in order to accomplish the peaceful arrival of the ONUC in Katanga. Frustrated with the reluctant attitude of the ONUC to intervene in Katanga, Lumumba advanced the Congolese troops (ANC) to Kasai Province. This move was intended to be the build-up for an attack on Katanga by ANC for which Lumumba had requested Soviet Union's assistance. On August 25th, ten Russian

²⁶ New York Times, "Sweden to send more observers" August 19th, 1958

IL-14 aircraft was confirmed to be refueling in Athens en route to the Congo²⁷. The Soviet Union criticized Hammarskjöld as “colonialist” by describing passive interpretation of the role of the ONUC.

Despite the fact that the most important aim of this mission approved in the Security Council, including the U.S and the Soviet Union, was to remove the Belgian troops from Katanga, the tension became severe between the central government headed by Joseph Mobutu supported by Western countries and pro-Soviet Union government with the president of Gizenga. However, after the announcement of the death of Lumumba in Katanga in February²⁸, the Security Council adopted a new resolution on 21st February 1961, requesting that the ONUC should play more active role in eliminating the Belgium troops in Katanga “if necessary with use of force at the last resort”²⁹. After the adoption, while Soviet Union weakened its criticism toward the UN, the UN hardened its policy toward Tshombe as well as Gizenga. Later on the first of August 1961, with the support of the UN and the US, Cyrille Adola, was designated as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo. On September 17th-18th, in the midst of his effort to settle the situation in Congo, Hammarskjöld was killed due to an accident while he was flying to Ndola by helicopter with his colleagues. The ONUC continued to the end of 1964.

How did the Swedish government decide to send its military contingent as part of the UN peace-keeping operation? The first request arrived from Hammarskjöld to the Swedish government on July 16th 1960, asking for smaller aircraft as well as pilots and technical personnels available in the UN Congo operation. The next day he asked The Foreign Minister, Osten Unden, whether Sweden could make its infantry available to the UN. Hammarskjöld thought it was important to include not only Congolese but also some European troops in the ONUC so that it could give assurance to the European people in Congo³⁰. After the discussions at the Advisory Committees, the Swedish government decided to send a contingent in Gaza to the Congo. The Prime Minister, Tage Elander and Unden were both in support of the decision³¹. The main part of the battalion departed from Gaza to

²⁷ Brian Urquhart, “*Hammarskjöld*” (W.W. Norton and Company 1994) 435-436

²⁸ According to the UN Yearbook 1960, Lumumba and his colleagues were announced to escape from detention in Katanga and they were found dead on 13th February.

²⁹ UN document (S4741) Resolution 161, 21, February 21th.

³⁰ Brian Urquhart, “*Hammarskjöld*” (W.W. Norton and Company 1994) 431

³¹ Unden, O. "Records 1952-1966". 2002, p. 616, from Johan Hanson, *Våra första internationella insatser – ett tecken på beslutsvilja?*

http://www.annalindhbiblioteket.se/publikationer/uppsatser/2005/chp0305/hansson_2022.pdf

the Congo on July 19th 1960³². At that time, the Congo peace-keeping operation was considered to be neutral, as Brian Urquhart explained later “Korean War was led by the US, but The Congo mission was definitely carried out by the hand of the UN³³. The Swedish government seemed to believe that ONUC operation was impartial and its participation in ONUC was compatible with its policy of neutrality. On January 25th, 1961, the Swedish government decided to send more troops in the Congo. Unden stated that “without anticipating a decision I assume Swedish participation in the United Nations policies in the Congo is still needed and desirable”³⁴.

However, some scholars recently have revealed that the policy-making of the UN peace-keeping operation in the Congo was influenced by the US in respect to its financial and logistic contribution. David. N. Gibbs argued that “ONUC officials participated in some of the US-led efforts to manipulate events in the Congo, including the intrigues against the Lumumba government and the efforts to establish Mobutu as a power within the military³⁵”. Sergei Mazov, a researcher who examined the Congo crisis from the Soviet Union perspective, also claimed “the USSR was in a weaker position in comparison to its main rival. Acting through Hammarskjold and the ‘Congolese Club’ in the UN Administration, the USA succeeded in using the ONUC forces as an effective instrument for exercising an extraordinary degree of influence to both contain “communist subversion” and secure Western interests under the cover of the United Nations³⁶. A Japanese researcher, Misu Takuya, supported Gibbs’ view by pointed out two facts: the U.S government instructed the CIA to conduct the underground campaigns to enable Cyrille Adoula to become the Prime Minister and that the U.S collaborated with some of the diplomats working closely in Secretary General’s Office³⁷.

It was difficult to deny that the ONUC played a significant role in preventing from drawing a larger conflict between great powers. But it was true that Soviet Union regarded the role of UN as part of Western activities and that Khrushchev even suspended the funding for the UN Congo operation. Taking into account of the U.S influence in the policy-making of ONUC, it could be doubtful whether the

³² Nile Skold, “*United Nation Peace Keeping after Suez War*” (Hurst&Company, London ST, Martin’s Press New York 1996)103

³³ Brian Urquhart “A life in Peace and War, (Norton and Company, 1991) 150

³⁴ New York Times, “*Sweden May send relief*” January 25th 1961,

³⁵ David. N. Gibbs “*The United Nations, international peace-keeping and the question of “impartiality”: revisiting the Congo operation of 1960.* (The Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 3, 2000), 377

³⁶ Sergei Mazov “*Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo*”(Cold War History, Volume 7, Issue 3 August 2007) 427

³⁷ 三須拓也「非介入の名のもとでの介入」緒方貞子・半澤朝彦編『グローバル・ガヴァナンスの歴史的変容—国連と国際政治史』（ミネルヴァ書房2005）205

Swedish government was aware of the fact that it risked its policy of non-alignment by taking side with the U.N which was under the influence of the U.S policy. Regardless of how well the Swedish government was aware of it or not, it was certain that the Swedish government put priority on the UN co-operation over the policy of neutrality. I would argue that in the case of Congo, Sweden's foreign policy was not necessarily driven by a realistic calculation of international environment but by the personal relationship with Hammarskjold and the motivation to contribute to international peace and order.

3, Conclusion

In previous parts, this paper reviewed briefly how Sweden reacted to four cases of UN co-operations, including the UN Peace-Keeping and UN Observer operations. This section will compare the four cases that the Swedish participation in UN operations and present the answer to the questions raised in preface: whether Sweden had always put priority on its neutral policy over its UN co-operation over 1950s and 1960s or not. Was it true that Sweden did participate actively in the UN operations only when the Swedish government found it possible to keep the policy of non-alignment?

My answer is that Sweden's first priority in foreign policy was to maintain non-alignment policy—the policy of neutrality—aiming to keep the country out of a potential conflict between great powers. Whenever there might be possibility of a conflict between great powers or whenever the condition which allowed its participation in the UN operation changed, the Swedish government would attempt to avoid participating in the UN operation and to secure the environment to maintain its non-aligned policy. However, there was one exception: the case of the Congo.

Although Sweden decided to participate in the UN peace-keeping operation in the Congo (ONUC) when it received the request from Hammarskjold, it was clear at that time that the U.S and Soviet Union agreed on the operation. However, as tensions between Kasavubu and Lumumba became worse, the U.S and Soviet Union attempted to support two respectively. As a result of their struggles, the U.N decision-making was not only led by the Secretary General's Office but also was highly influenced by U.S initiatives. In this sense, it was doubtful that Sweden placed priority on its policy of neutrality over the participation in the UN, as it did in previous cases.

In the case of Korean War, the Swedish government decided not to offer the military assistance but to give humanitarian aid in the form of hospital unit because it was clear that the UN forces were mainly consisting of the U.S army and that there was possibility for the war to develop into the major conflict between great powers. In Suez War, the UN established the United Nations Emergency Forces composed of small countries in order to withdraw the troops of Britain, France and Israel from Egypt. The Swedish government found no contradiction to maintain its neutrality and participation in the UN operation. Firstly, the possibility of the war between the great powers was considered to be low since both the U.S and Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of the UNEF. Secondly, the military interventions of Britain, France and Israel were clearly challenges to the order of the United Nations. Thirdly, leaving these military troops in the area would trigger the intervention of Soviet Union and China, which might develop into the war between great powers. In this sense, it was logical that Sweden contributed to the UNEF with a possibility of securing of its neutral policy.

In Lebanon crisis, the Swedish government took initiative to propose the resolution requesting to create the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to ensure that "there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders". However, as the U.S dispatched its troops in Lebanon in request from the Lebanese government, the Swedish government requested the intention to withdraw its observatory group because the deployment of the U.S troops might draw the possibility of other countries' intervention.

The overall conclusion is that while in the certain cases, Sweden decided to participate in UN operations by finding the potential to keep itself out of a conflict between the great powers, in the case of the Congo, Sweden's foreign policy was not necessarily driven by a pragmatic response to the international environment but by the personal relationship with Hammarskjold and the idealistic desire to contribute to international peace and order.

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